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ABSTRACT
IP Geolocation databases are widely used in online services to map
end user IP addresses to their geographical locations. However, they
use proprietary geolocation methods and in some cases they have
poor accuracy. We propose a systematic approach to use publicly
accessible reverse DNS hostnames for geolocating IP addresses. Our
method is designed to be combined with other geolocation data
sources. We cast the task as a machine learning problem where
for a given hostname, we generate and rank a list of potential
location candidates. We evaluate our approach against three state
of the art academic baselines and two state of the art commercial
IP geolocation databases. We show that our work significantly
outperforms the academic baselines, and is complementary and
competitive with commercial databases. To aid reproducibility, we
open source our entire approach.
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KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
IP Geolocation databases map IP addresses to their corresponding
geographical locations. They are often used to find the approximate
location of an IP address at the city level. Records in these databases
typically contain IP ranges along with their physical location. These
databases are vital to a variety of online services when the exact
location of a user is not available. Table 1 lists a few examples of
such records. For instance, the second example in the table maps a
/24 subnet (256 IPs) to Hengyang, a city in China. While some users
opt-in to share their exact coordinates to online services through
devices with global positioning sensors or Wi-Fi based geolocation,
others decline or use devices without such features. IP geolocation
is therefore a valuable source of information on user location.
A practical application of IP geolocation is personalized local
search results in the context of search engines. Figure 2 demon-
strates the striking difference in results for the query "restaurants"
when the user location is unknown, compared to when it is known.
The generic nationwide results require the user to requery for more
specific restaurants in their area, while the personalized results di-
rectly list restaurants tailored to a specific location. Previous work
has shown that personalizing results to a user’s location leads to
∗Also with Microsoft Bing.
Table 1: Example of entries from an IP Geolocation database
StartIP EndIP Country Region City
1.0.16.0 1.0.16.255 JP Tokyo Tokyo
124.228.150.0 124.228.150.255 CN Hunan Hengyang
131.107.147.0 131.107.147.255 US Washington Redmond
increased user satisfaction and conversely that missing location
information leads to user dissatisfaction [2, 7, 25]. IP geolocation
databases are also used in many other applications, including: con-
tent personalization and online advertising to serve content
local to the user [2, 18, 26], content delivery networks to direct
users to the closest datacenter [19], law enforcement to fight cy-
bercrime [43], geographic content licensing to restrict content
delivery to licensed geographic regions [29], and e-commerce to
display variable pricing based on local taxes and shipping [45].
adsl-42.wallingford.ct.bigisp.us
Exact City 
Name Match
State match 
(admin region)
USA Top-
level domain
Connection 
characteristics
Figure 1: Example of information that can be extracted
from reverse DNS hostnames, including location informa-
tion such as city name, state, country, as well as physical
connection characteristics.
Commercial IP geolocation databases such as MaxMind [30],
Neustar IP Intelligence [33], and IP2Location [22] are considered
state of the art. They combinemultiple IP location sources, including
WHOIS lookups, network latency, network topology, reverse DNS,
as well as direct contracts with Internet Service Providers [32].
However, the exact methods they use are proprietary. Some of
these approaches have been studied in academia to some extent, as
described in Section 2. Related work has shown that while they have
high coverage, commercial databases are sometimes inaccurate or
are missing location information for some IP ranges [15, 37, 42].
Ourwork focuses on extracting location information from
reverse DNS hostnames assigned to IP addresses, which has
many potential advantages including high coverage and accuracy.
These hostnames can be periodically collected in a short amount of
time by performing a reverse DNS lookup for every address in the
IP space. Figure 1 exemplifies the information that can be parsed
from reverse DNS hostnames. Here we can derive both the location
and connection characteristics for the hostname of an IP address. A
person reading the name of the hostname can reasonably determine
that it references Wallingford, a town in Connecticut, USA.
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Figure 2: Effect of missing location information for the query "restaurants". The left image displays the results when the
location is unknown. The right image displays a personalized experience for a user located in New York City.
Reverse DNS is the opposite of Forward DNS. Forward DNS
starts from a domain or subdomain such as www.bing.com and
resolves to zero, one, or more IP addresses [31]. Note that multi-
ple subdomains can map to the same IP. Conversely, reverse DNS
lookups start from an IP address and typically return zero or one
hostnames [8]. The reverse DNS hostname does not need to be the
same as the Forward DNS hostname. While Forward DNS lookups
are used by Internet users to get to websites, Reverse DNS host-
names are typically used to name and describe the underlying
physical infrastructure that makes up the Internet.
Figure 3 contains examples of both forward and reverse DNS
resolution.
www.bing.com 
204.79.197.200www.msn.com 
www.msdn.com 
204.79.197.200 a-0001.a-msedge.net
Figure 3: Example of the difference between Forward DNS
(top) and Reverse DNS (bottom)
Given a reverse DNS hostname, our task is to determine
its location at the city level. This task poses multiple challenges.
First, the naming schemes of Internet Service Providers are often ad-
hoc and do not always contain the full names or common abbrevia-
tions of cities. For example, the drr01.cral.id.frontiernet.net
hostname is located in Coeur D’Alene, Idaho. Determining that the
cral substring maps to this location is difficult even for a human.
Second, many cities around the world have ambiguous names. Take
for instance Vancouver, Canada and Vancouver, USA. A hostname
which only contains the substring vancouver is not specific enough
to determine a single location correctly. Even unambiguous city
names can become ambiguous when abbreviations are used instead
of their full names. Does nwmd refer toNew Richmond, WI or toNew
Maryland, NB, or to neither of them? Third, sometimes hostnames
contain multiple or conflicting locations. For example, it is diffi-
cult to determine if sur01.tacoma.wa.seattle.comcast.net is
located in Seattle, WA, Tacoma, WA, or maybe even Sumner, WA.
We propose a systematic approach for using reverse DNS host-
names to geolocate IP addresses. Our contributions are:
(1)In our preliminary investigation we determine reverse DNS
coverage in the entire IPv4 address space. We also find an upper
bound of exact city and airport code matches.
(2)We present a machine learning approach for extracting
loc tions from hostnames. We cast the task as a machine
learning problem where for a given hostname, we split the host-
name into its constituent terms, we generate a list of potential
location candidates, and then we classify each hostname and
candidate pair using a binary classifier to determine which can-
didates are plausible. Finally, we rank the remaining candidates
by confidence, and we break the ties by location popularity.
(3)We evaluate our approach against state-of-the-art base-
lines. Using a large ground truth set, we evaluate our approach
against three academic baselines and two commercial IP geolo-
cation databases. We show that our method significantly out-
performs academic baselines. We also show that the academic
baselines contain incorrect rules which impact their performance.
Finally, we demonstrate that our approach is both competitive
and complementary to commercial geolocation baselines, which
shows that our method can help improve their accuracy.
(4)We release our approach as open source. To help the aca-
demic community reproduce our results, we release our reverse
DNS geolocation software as open source.
2 RELATEDWORK
We divide IP geolocation research in two broad categories, based on
the methods they use: network delay and topology approaches
use ping, traceroute, and BGP network structure information; web
mining approaches use diverse information mined from the web,
including WHOIS databases, social graphs, and reverse DNS.
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The majority of IP geolocation research relies on active network
delay measurements to locate addresses. These approaches issue
pings or traceroutes from multiple geographically distributed land-
mark servers to a target IP, then triangulate the location [6, 10, 16,
23, 24, 27, 28, 36, 50]. Multiple systems such as Octant [49], Alidade
[5], or HLOC [41] combine delay measurement methods with other
data sources such as reverse DNS and WHOIS information.
Network delay and topology methods have significant limita-
tions. First, they have scalability issues as they require access to
landmark servers distributed around the world and each target
IP needs separate measurements. Second, not all networks allow
ping and traceroute. Third, routes on the Internet do not neces-
sarily map to geographic distances. These problems often lead to
lackluster results, with error distance in the order of hundreds of
kilometers [16, 36]. Some of the earlier research is also plagued by
extremely small ground truth datasets, often focusing on a handful
of IP addresses in a few US universities [16, 24, 36, 50].
Our work addresses several of these limitations. First, using re-
verse DNS hostnames for geolocation does not require any network
delaymeasurements. Reverse DNS hostnames can be obtainedmuch
faster than performing active delay measurements, by querying
DNS servers. Second, our ground truth dataset is several orders of
magnitude larger than the ones used in previous work and it spans
the entire planet. Third, our approach of extracting locations from
hostnames can be performed offline. Fourth, our results have lower
median error distance than most previous work.
Web mining approaches use diverse information mined from
the web. Guo et al. [17] extract locations mentioned in web pages
and assign the locations to the IPs which host the content. Although
they report city level agreement for 87% of the IPs, they use an IP
geolocation database with unknown accuracy as ground truth. Endo
and Sadok [9] propose using whois information. Unfortunately, the
evaluation section lacks a comparison against ground truth. Wang
et al. [47] combine a network delay approach with extracting the
location of web servers from the web pages that they host. They
obtain a median error of 0.69 kilometers for the best data set, which
contains only 88 target IP addresses. Backstrom et al. [1] propose
deriving the location of target users based on the locations of friends.
However, this approach requires access to users’ social graphs. It
achieves a median error distance of 590 km on 2,830 IPs.
In thisworkwe propose extracting IP locations from their
reverse DNS hostnames. GeoTrack [36], proposed by Padmanab-
han and Subramanian, is one of the earliest reverse DNS geolocation
approaches. It uses manual rules to determine locations of host-
names in the United States using city names, airport codes, and
country codes. It then combines this approach with traceroutes to
estimate the location of a target IP. Our machine learning approach
does not require manual rules and it achieves a median error of
tens of kilometers using a test set of millions of IP addresses.
Undns is the most well-known and widely used reverse DNS
geolocation approach [44]. Similarly to GeoTrack, it consists of man-
ual rules which are expressed as regular expressions at the domain
level. For example, the rule ([A-Z]3,4)[0-9]?.verizon-gni.net
matches the hostname PHIL.verizon-gni.net. A domain specific
location dictionary is then used to match the extracted slot PHIL to
Philadelphia, PA. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that
each domain requires manually generated and potentially error
prone rules. In comparison, our approach is more scalable since
it does not require human generated rules. It also handles unique
situations better, since it considers the terms of each hostname
individually, without requiring domain-specific training. In Section
6.3 we show that our approach significantly outperforms undns.
Multiple geolocation and network topology papers use undns as-is
to draw conclusions or perform experiments [14, 34]. Unfortunately,
we demonstrate that undns results suffer due to catch-all rules.
DRoP, another state of the art reverse DNS based approach, aims
to geolocate hostnames using automatically generated rules gener-
ated by finding patterns across all the hostname terms of a domain
[20]. For example, it may find that for the domain cogentco.com,
the second term from the right often contains airport codes. These
rules are then validated using network delay information. DRoP
places 99% of IPs in 5 test domains within 40 km of their actual
location. However, it uses network delay measurements, its method
of splitting hostnames is rudimentary, and as we show in Section
6.3, it performs poorly on worldwide ISP domains.
Finally DDec [11] combines undns and DRoP rules by giving
precedence to undns and using DRoP as fallback.
3 DATASETS
This section contains descriptions of the datasets we use throughout
this paper for experiments, training and testing.
Our ground truth set contains 67 million IP addresses with
known geographic location. To the best of our knowledge, it is the
largest and most diverse set used in geolocation literature. We com-
piled the ground truth set in March 2018 by randomly sampling the
query logs of a large-scale commercial search engine. We describe
the characteristics of this dataset in more detail in Section 6.1.
GeoNames is a free database with geographical information
[48]. The March 2018 snapshot we used contains information on
11.5 million geographic features from all countries in the world.
From Geonames we used multiple subsets available separately for
download. Cities 1000 consists of information on all cities in the
world with a population of at least 1,000, including coordinates,
original names, ASCII names, alternate names, and codes of admin-
istrative divisions. Alternate Names contains more alternate names
for some cities such as abbreviations, colloquial names, and historic
names. More importantly, it also contains airport codes issued by
IATA, ICAO, and FAAC, which are travel organizations. Admin 1
Codes is comprised of the codes and names of first-level adminis-
trative regions. Country Info contains general information about
countries, including their Internet top-level domain (TLD).
CLLI is an abbreviation for Common Language Location Iden-
tifier. These codes are used by the North American telecommuni-
cations industry to designate names of locations and functions of
telecommunications equipment. While historically only used by
the Bell Telephone companies, they were more recently adopted
by other companies as well. Multiple codes can map to the same
location. For example, all the following codes map to Chicago, Illi-
nois: chcgil, chchil, chciil, chcjil, and chclil. Note that the
codes cannot necessarily be derived from the name of the city. This
database is available from multiple sources. We acquired a May
2017 snapshot from TelcoData [46] for a token amount.
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UN/LOCODE, which stands for United Nations Code for Trade
and Transport Locations, is a worldwide geographic coding scheme
developed and maintained by the UN. It assigns codes to locations
used in trade and transport, such as rail yards, sea ports, and airports.
The code assigned to Paris, France is FRPAR and the functions listed
for this location are: port, rail, road, and postal. This dataset
is updated twice a year and it is available for free on the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe website [12]. We used
the December 2017 release, which was the latest available version.
Public Suffix List, maintained by the Mozilla Foundation, is a
free list of domain suffixes under which Internet users can directly
register names [13]. Examples include cloudapp.net and gov.uk.
Rapid7 Reverse DNS consists of reverse DNS hostnames of the
entire IPv4 address space. The dataset is available for free and it
is updated weekly. The archive contains snapshots going back to
2013 [40]. We discuss this dataset in detail in the next section.
4 REVERSE DNS
Forward DNS lookups convert hostnames such as www.bing.com
into IP addresses, while reverse DNS lookups work in the other
direction; they start from an IP address and find a hostname. Since
the forward and reverse DNS lookups are set in different
DNS records, they do not need to have the same hostname.
Reverse hostnames are more likely to be used to name the underly-
ing networking infrastructure, while forward hostnames are used
to name websites or other online services [31].
IPv6 addresses also have reverse DNS hostnames. The only dif-
ference is that the records are under the ip6.arpa domain.While
we evaluate our approach on IPv4, all methods described in
this paper can be equally applied to IPv6 addresses as well.
To determine the viability of using reverse DNS hostnames for
geolocation, we studied the Rapid7 reverse DNS dataset [40], which
covers the entire IPv4 address space. Rapid7 compiles it by perform-
ing IPv4 PTR lookups over the entire address space as described
above, except for ranges that are blacklisted or private. The archive
contains snapshots going back to 2013 [39]. This preliminary inves-
tigation is based on a snapshot taken in January 2017, while in the
rest of the paper we use a more recent dataset from March 2018.
The IPv4 address space consists of all 32-bit numbers. This limits
the possible address space to 232 (4.3 billion) addresses. The number
of usable IPs is actually only 3.7 billion, since some IP ranges are
designated as special-use or private [21]. Since not all IP addresses
have a reverse DNS hostname, we parsed the Rapid7 dataset to find
the actual coverage. We found that 1.25 billion addresses have a
reverse DNS hostname. This finding shows that although they have
significant coverage, these hostnames need to be augmented with
other data to obtain a complete geolocation database.
We then quantified how many of the hostnames are valid, since
the DNS records are unrestricted strings. We parsed each hostname
and rejected the ones that did not respect Internet host naming
rules [3]. We also rejected hostnames that did not have a valid
suffix as defined by the Public Suffix List, which is a list of valid
domain suffixes from the Mozilla Foundation previously described
in Section 3. This left us with 1.24 billion hostnames, of which
1.15 billion were distinct. Our findings are summarized in Table 2,
which shows that 33.4% of usable IP addresses have a valid reverse
Table 2: Usage of Reverse DNS hostnames across IPv4 space
Set name Size % of usable % of distinct
Total IPv4 space 4.3 B
Reserved IP addresses 0.6 B
Usable IP addresses 3.7 B
IPs with Reverse DNS hostnames 1.25 B 33.7%
Valid Reverse DNS hostnames 1.24 B 33.4%
Distinct DNS hostnames 1.15 B 31.1%
Exact city match (naive) 0.16 B 4.4% 14.1%
Airport code match (naive) 0.27 B 7.4% 23.5%
DNS hostname, and 31.1% are distinct. Considering that not all IPv4
addresses are yet allocated, the actual percentage is likely higher.
Next, we set out to determine if reverse DNS hostnames are a
valuable source of geolocation information. We searched for exact
city names and airport codes in the hostnames, using the Cities 1000
and the Alternate Names dataset, respectively. We find that 163.7
million hostnames could contain exact city names, and 272.9 million
hostnames could contain airport codes. This approach represents
an upper-bound of the number of hostnames that could contain
exact city names or airport codes. The results contain true posi-
tives such as sur01.seattle.wa.seattle.comcast.net in Seat-
tle, Washington and inovea5.gs.par.ivision.fr in Paris, France.
However, this naive approach also matches false negatives such
as node-j.pool-1-0.dynamic.totbb.net which is not in Pool,
UK and mobile.bigredgroup.net.au which is not in Mobile, Al-
abama. Nevertheless, the results summarized in Table 2 show that
there are potentially hundreds of millions of hostnames that could
contain geographic information, using just these two features alone.
We conclude that while the results are promising, a more sophisti-
cated approach could achieve higher coverage and accuracy.
To further familiarize ourselves with hostname naming conven-
tions, we extracted the top hostname components of the largest 10
domains in the Rapid7 dataset. We divided each subdomain on the
dotted terms, and then we further split the components on dashes
and on the transitions between numbers and letters. For example,
we split soc-l.wht2.ocn.ne.jp into soc, l, wht. We then manu-
ally labeled the components that we found to reasonably correspond
to geographic locations. We also cross-checked our findings with
commercial geolocation databases. Table 3 shows a sumary of the
results. We observe that only 4 out of the top 10 domains contain in-
dicators of geographic location. However, those that use geographic
encodings do so extensively. We found that service providers use
various naming conventions across different networks and within a
single network. For instance, the hostnames under the sbcglobal.net
domain owned by AT&T make use of abbreviations such as pltn
to refer to Pleasanton, CA. But they also use combinations of city
abbreviations with State names such as chcgil to refer to Chicago,
Illinois. Our findings are in line with previous work by Chabarek
and Barford [4]. They found that all 8 of the providers they studied
used multiple naming schemes. They also found that 20 out of 22
North American providers they surveyed use geographic encodings
in their hostnames.
We also studied the distribution of top-level domains (TLDs)
such as .com and .fr in the Rapid7 dataset to determine if country-
specific domains can be used as location hints. We observed that
most hostnames contain a .net domain at 33.2%, followed by .com
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Table 3: Top hostname components of the largest 10 domains that have reverse DNS hostnames. We manually highlighted
locations with underlined blue. The percentages in the valid and usable columns are based on rows 3 and 5 of Table 2.
Domain Count % of valid Top hostname components sorted in descending order by how often they appear in all hostnames of this domain
comcast.net 50.0M 4.0% c, hsd, hsd1, m, ca, pa, fl, il,ma, ga, a, co,mi, d, f,wa, b, e, va, nj, or,md, tx, chlm, chic, phil, tn, in, npls, dd, atlt, sjos, denv,mn
bbtec.net 37.2M 3.0% softbank, biz
rr.com 31.1M 2.5% res, cpe, mta, socal, biz, rrcs, nyc, neo, nc, wi, kya, columbus, cinci, carolina, tx, central, twcny, nycap, west, sw, rochester
myvzw.com 29.6M 2.4% sub, qarestr
sbcglobal.net 28.4M 2.3% lightspeed, adsl, dsl, irvnca, hstntx, rcsntx, cicril, sntcca, tukrga,miamfl, pltn, pltn13, stlsmo, livnmi, bcvloh, frokca, chcgil
t-ipconnect.de 24.5M 2.0% dip, dip0, p, b, e, a, f, d, c, pd, fc, fd, fe, ff, de, dd, dc, df, ee, bb, bd, bc, ae, ac, aa, ab, af, ad, ba, bf, ea, eb, be, ec, fa, ed, fb, ef, db, da, ca, cf
telecomitalia.it 19.4M 1.6% host, static, business, b, r, retail, dynamic, host156, host15, host94, host61, host127, host232, host112, host95, host72, host107, host220
ge.com 16.7M 1.4% static, n, n003, n003-000-000-000, n129, n144, n144-220-000-000, n129-201-000-000, n129-202-000-000, n165-156-000-000m n165, n192
ocn.ne.jp 16.2M 1.3% p, ipngn, tokyo, osaka, ipbf,marunouchi, ipbfp, omed, omed01, kanagawa, hodogaya, aichi, osakachuo, saitama, hokkaido
spcsdns.net 16.0M 1.3% pools, static
Table 4: Reverse DNS hostname changes across 4 years
Change / Year Pair 2014→2015 2015→2016 2016→2017
Hostnames changed (incl. empty) 179M (14.7%) 159.3M (12.6%) 164.8M (12.8%)
Hostnames changed (non-empty) 26.4M (2.2%) 20.7M (1.6%) 14.2M (1.1%)
Hostnames gained 108.5M (8.9%) 89.3M (7.1%) 81M (6.3%)
Hostnames lost 44M (3.6%) 49.4M (3.9%) 70M (5.4%)
with only 17.2%. This is the opposite of forward DNS, where .com
is more popular. The difference is due to Internet Service Providers
preferring to use .net domains for hostnames that describe the
underlying physical architecture of their network. After removing
the .com, .net, .edu, and .mil domains which together make up
51.6% of valid hostnames, we are left with approximately 600million
hostnames, the vast majority of which are country-specific. We
found very few novelty TLDs used in reverse DNS hostnames. We
conclude that the corresponding country of a reverse DNS domain
could potentially be a useful hint in geolocation.
Finally, we compared snapshots of the dataset, each collected in
the month of January of years 2014 to 2017, inclusive. Our goal was
to determine how the characteristics of the hostnames change in
time. For each IP in the snapshot we compared the hostname values
in consecutive years. Table 4 shows a summary of the results. We
found that a maximum of 14.7% of hostnames changed year over
year and 63.7% of them remain the same across all four years. These
numbers include the cases where one side of the comparison had
a hostname but the other side was empty due to the DNS query
returning an empty hostname, or due to the request failing because
of network failures during data collection. We then performed a
similar comparison, this time counting only the cases where both
sides of the comparison contained non-empty hostnames. Here we
found that a maximum of 2.2% hostnames change over the years,
if both the values are present. To understand why there is such a
large discrepancy between these two findings we also determined
the number of hosts that were gained or list between the years.
By hostnames gained we mean that in the older year a hostname
was missing, while in the subsequent year it was present, and by
hostnames lost we mean the opposite. The results show that yearly
more hostnames are gained than lost, at about a ratio of 2:1.
In summary, we determined that 1.24 billion IP addresses have
valid reverse DNS hostnames with 1.15 billion distinct values, many
of which contain exact city or airport code matches.
5 APPROACH
We cast the problem of extracting locations from reverse DNS host-
names as a machine learning problem. We train a binary classifier
on a dataset where each training sample is a hostname and loca-
tion candidate pair, along with a binary label which signifies if
the hostname is likely or unlikely to be in the candidate location.
Given a new hostname, our proposed approach splits the host-
name into components, finds a preliminary list of location candi-
dates, generates primary and secondary features for each candidate,
then classifies each potential location using the classifier, also as-
signing each candidate a confidence score. For instance, for the
hostname ce-salmor0w03w.cpe.or.portland.bigisp.net our
approach considers tens of potential location candidates, includ-
ing Portland, UK and Salmoral, Spain. In the end however, it ranks
Salem, Oregon and Portland, Oregon as the most likely candidates.
5.1 Splitting hostnames
Drawing from our preliminary analysis in Section 4, as well as
further manual analysis, we implemented multiple heuristics for
splitting hostnames into their constituent components.
First, we apply the ToUnicode algorithm described in RFC3490
[35] to convert International Domain Names (IDN) to Unicode.
The reason we perform this translation is that international host-
names are stored as ASCII strings using Punycode transcription.
For example, the hostname xn--0rsod70av79j.xn--j6w193g gets
converted to夏威夷舞.香港. This allows us to perform location
lookups using the original language of the hostname.
Second, we separate the subdomain from the domain and the
public suffix, using the list provided by the Mozilla Foundation
previously described in Section 3. These suffixes are a superset
of normal TLDs because they also contain entire domains under
which users can create subdomains. For example, the list con-
tains the pseudo-TLD azurewebsites.net since users of Azure
cloud services can register their own subdomains under this name.
At this point we also extract the native TLD. For instance, for
dps8099.denver.k12.co.uswe extract denver.k12.co.us as the
domain because k12.co.us is a public suffix, we extract dps8099
as the subdomain, and finally we extract .us as the TLD.
Third, we split the extracted subdomain at three levels of aggre-
gation: on the dotted elements, on hyphens within the dotted ele-
ments, and on the transitions between letters and numbers within
the hyphenated elements, saving the results at each level. Figure 4
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pl2313.nas81o-1.p-aichi.nttpc.ne.jp
pl2313 nas81o-1 p-aichi
pl nas81o p aichi
jp
o
2313 1
nas 81
pl2313.nas81o-1.p-aichi.nttpc.ne.jp
Figure 4: Hostname Splitter example with pruning
97-88-57-240.dhcp.roch.mn.charter.com
F1 F2 … Fn Fn+1 Fn+2 … Fn+m
F1 F2 … Fn
Primary hostname
features
Secondary hostname
+ candidate features
["97-88-57-240", "dhcp", "roch", "mn"]
Hostname Splitter
Location candidates feature generation
Fn+1 Fn+2 … Fn+m
Location
Candidates
Candidate 2: Rocha, Uruguay
Candidate 1: Rochester, MN, US
Figure 5: Feature Matching and Generation
contains a specific example represented intuitively as a tree struc-
ture. The bottom three levels of the tree correspond to the three
levels of aggregation. As a last step, we trim the leaf nodes. We
remove any leaf node consisting solely of numbers. We also re-
move common terms terms related to connection characteristics,
such as dsl, fiber, and nas. We obtained them by counting the
top extracted leaf nodes in the training set and manually selecting
the ones which are unrelated to geolocation but clearly related to
the underlying network infrastructure. The list is available in the
source code we are publishing along with this paper.
5.2 Features
Starting from the results of the hostname splitter, we find the loca-
tion candidates along with their primary and secondary features,
as defined below. The list of preliminary location candidates
is defined by the union of locations which match any of the
primary features of the hostname. Figure 5 shows a concrete
example. Primary features can be derived directly from a hostname.
These features are matched using a single contiguous string which
indicate a location at city level granularity. Primary feature genera-
tion and candidate selection happen at the same time. Secondary
features are generated in the context of a hostname and location
candidate pair. These features require the context of a primary
candidate to match. In our example two location candidates and
their primary features are first selected based on the term roch in
the hostname. Then we compute secondary features separately for
each candidate. In the context of Rochester, Minnesota, we match
the mn term as a secondary feature that captures the administrative
region for this candidate.
Primary features are based on the GeoNames, UN/LOCODE,
and CLLI datasets described in Section 3. From GeoNames we use
the Cities 1000, Alternate Names, and Admin 1 Codes subsets. The
Table 5: Primary Feature Categories
Category Example Location
City Name p907072-li-mobac01.osaka.ocn.ne.jp Osaka, JP
Alternate names 178235248188.warszawa.vectranet.pl Warsaw, PL
Abbreviations cpe-68-173-83-248.nyc.res.rr.com New York City
City + Admin1 torontoon-rta-1.inhouse.compuserve.com Toronto, ON
City + Country er1-ge-7-1.londonuk5.savvis.net London, UK
No Vowels Name static-50-47-60-130.sttl.wa.frontiernet.net Seattle, WA
First Letters 97-90-205-107.dhcp.losa.ca.charter.com Los Angeles
Airport Code 62.80.122.50.fra.de.eunx.net Frankfurt, DE
CLLI Code 99-166-111-251.tukrga.sbcglobal.net Tucker, GA
UN/LOCODE 16.151.88.129,krsel19d.kor.hp.com Korea, Seoul
Host Patterns atoulon-651-1-29-109.abo.wanadoo.fr Toulon, FR
Table 6: Secondary Features Categories
Category Candidate Match Example
Admin1 Johnstown, PA 138-207-246-119.jst.pa.atlanticbb.net
First Letters Admin 1 Ft. Huachuca, AZ frth-bw-noc.ariz.aisco.ngb.army.mil
Country Paris, FR ci77.paris12eme.fr.psi.net
Country TLD Barcelona, ES barcelona.fib.upc.es
primary feature categories are listed in Table 5. Each of these cate-
gories is represented by three specific features: IsMatch, Population,
and MatchedLettersCount. The IsMatch feature is a boolean which
indicates if the feature matched the current hostname and current
location candidate. The Population feature contains the population
of the current location, if IsMatch is true. We use population as a
proxy for the importance of a city candidate. Finally, MatchedLet-
tersCount contains the number of characters which matched. As
the number of characters in common between a hostname and a
location increases, it could mean a higher confidence match. For
instance, if the hostname contains the letters seattle and the cur-
rent location candidate is Seattle, Washington, then the CityName-
MatchedLettersCount Feature would have a value of seven.
While most feature categories in Table 5 are self-explanatory,
we describe them here briefly. The City Name category matches
entire names of cities. Alternate names matches translations and
colloquial names of locations. Abbreviations are based on the first
letters of cities with longer names, such as sf for San Francisco.
The City + Admin1 category consists of concatenations of city
and administrative regions, such as seattlewa. Similarly, City +
Country matches combinations of city and country names.
The intent of the No Vowel Name feature is to match city names
without vowels. It allows partial matches using the first 3 or more
letters of the names. For example, this allows matching gnvl to
Greenville, SC and rvrs to Riverside, CA. Furthermore, based on
our observations we extended this feature with more complex vari-
ations. We select the first and last letters of each word in the name,
even if the letters are vowels. We then generate combinations of
letters from this list, in order. Examples matched by this variation
include oxfr for Oxford, MA, and ftmy for Fort Meyers, FL.
The First Letters features use the first consecutive letters of loca-
tions. The Airport Code category spans airport codes from travel
organizations. CLLI and UN/LOCODE codes match telecommunica-
tions and transportation codes of locations, respectively.
Finally, Host Patterns attempts to capture rules not encompassed
by the other features. Using training data we extract frequently
co-occurring hostname term permutations of one or two terms.
We then aggregate the training data per domain and within a
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domain on the term permutations. If at least 40% of the train-
ing locations for a permutation are located within a 20 kilome-
ter radius, we convert the term permutation into a rule. We de-
termined the support ratio and the distance radius using a small
validation set. For example, this feature determines that when-
ever a hostname in the frontiernet.net domain contains the
term or in the rightmost position and the term mmvl in the sec-
ond rightmost position, then the hostname is most likely located
in McMinnville, Oregon. This feature would then match for the
hostname static-50-126-80-6.mmvl.or.frontiernet.net.
Secondary features are determined in the context of a host-
name and location candidate pair. As shown in Figure 5, we first
determine all candidates before we can compute the secondary
features. An example of secondary features for the Rochester, MN
candidate is Admin1 Match, which is true only if the administrative
region of the candidate location can be found in a different term of
the hostname. Since the hostname contains the term mn, which is
an abbreviation of Minnesota, then this secondary feature is true
for the first candidate. However, it is false for the second candidate,
because Rocha is in an administrative region also called Rocha, and
it cannot be found in the hostname. First Letters Admin 1 is similar,
but it matches at least 3 first consecutive letters of administrative
names. Country and Country TLD both try to match the country
of the current candidate by searching for a country code in the
hostname terms or in the domain TLD, respectively.
5.3 Classifier
For a given hostname, our reverse DNS geolocation can extract and
evaluate tens of potential location candidates. For example, if one
of the terms of the hostname is york, the initial list of candidates
will contain all locations named York in the world. We run a binary
classifier on each of the initial candidates. The classifier uses the
primary and secondary features to evaluate if it is plausible for the
hostname to be located in a candidate location. All the candidates
where the classifier returns false are discarded. The remaining
plausible candidates are sorted by confidence and returned in a list.
Although determining the optimal type of binary classifier is
outside of the scope of this work, we tested four variations of the
classifier: logistic regression, C4.5 decision trees, random forest, and
SVM. Logistic regression had the best performance on a small vali-
dation set. Consequently, we performed all experiments in Section
6 using this classifier.
5.4 Sampling Strategy
We propose sampling the training set to account for data bias, to
improve generalization, and to reduce the amount of required train-
ing data. First, the entire set of reverse DNS hostnames is naturally
skewed towards the largest Internet Service Providers, which own
the most addresses. Second, some feature categories such as City
Name occur much more often than others such as Abbreviations.
This can lead the classifier to ignore less frequent features cate-
gories. Third, during training multiple location candidates can be
generated for each hostname, out of which at most one can be
correct. Since the classifier is trained on hostname and candidate
pairs, this also introduces another type of bias where the number
of negative samples significantly outweighs the number of positive
ones. Therefore, we sample data to account for some of this bias and
to improve generalization through increased training data diversity.
We perform stratified sampling on the domain of the hostname,
keeping at most X samples per domain. This approach ensures that
naming schemes of large organizations do not significantly skew
the training data. We further increase feature diversity by keeping a
ratio ofY : 1 between the number of samples that contain the most
commonly occurring feature and the ones that contain the least
occurring feature. Finally, we also enforce a ratio ofZ : 1 between
the number of negative and positive examples. We evaluate our
data sampling strategy and its three parameters in Section 6.2.
6 EVALUATION
We evaluate our approach against three state-of-the-art academic
baselines and two commercial geolocation databases. We show that
our method significantly outperforms academic baselines and is
complementary and competitive to commercial databases.
6.1 Ground Truth
Our ground truth dataset contains 67 million IP addresses with
known IP location, of which we used 40 million for training and 27
million for testing. We compiled the dataset in March 2018 from a
subset of the query log of a major search engine. Each IP address
has a corresponding location obtained from users that opted in
to provide their location through devices connected to cellular
networks or home Wi-Fi networks. We discarded any IP address
that was present in multiple cities over the course of a month.
The locations were aggregated at IP and city level by an automated
pipeline. We did not have access to the locations of individual users.
6.2 Preliminary Evaluation
We conducted two experiments to evaluate the binary classifier in
isolation. In the first experiment, we randomly selected 100,000 IP
addresses from the training set and performed ten-fold cross valida-
tion. We did not further sample the data in any other way. For each
hostname, we extracted location candidates, then ran the binary
classifier on all the pairs between the target hostname and each
of its candidates. Since our approach can return multiple plau-
sible locations for a given hostname, we choose the candidate
with the highest classifier confidence. We break ties by selecting
the location with the highest population, as a proxy of popularity.
We obtained an overall accuracy of 99%, mostly because the vast
majority of results were true negatives. However, the true positive
rate was only 67.6%, precision was 80.9%, and recall was 67.6%.
In the second experiment we introduced training data sampling
as described in Section 5.4. We set the X, Y, and Z parameters
to 200, 10, and 3, respectively. We again performed ten-fold cross
validation. Although accuracy decreased to 92.9%, we obtained
better results for true positive rate, precision, and recall, at 78.8%,
88.5%, and 78.8%, respectively. We varied the values of the X, Y,
and Z parameters using exhaustive search but this did not alter
the results significantly. In conclusion, our sampling strategy helps
the classifier generalize and it significantly improves results.
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Table 7: Evaluation against three state of the art academic baselines. undns fromUniversity ofWashington consists of manual
rules, DRoP from University of California’s CAIDA uses automatically generated rules, and DDec also from CAIDA uses a
combination of the first two. Results for our approach, which is fully automated, are under the RDNS heading.
Metric → Median Error in km (lower is better) RMSE based on km (lower is better) Coverage (higher is better) Combined score (higher is better)
Domain ↓ # undns DRoP DDec RDNS undns DRoP DDec RDNS undns DRoP DDec RDNS undns DRoP DDec RDNS
163data.com.cn 166K 1,517.5 N/A 1,517.5 10.6 1,495 N/A 1,495 404 100% N/A 100% 94.5% 0.67 N/A 0.67 2.34
bell.ca 200K N/A 5,875.2 5,875.2 6.0 N/A 5,807 5,807 1,262 N/A 2.3% 2.3% 95.7% N/A 0.00 0.00 0.76
brasiltelecom.net.br 32K 808.7 5,628.7 808.7 15.2 889 5,620 889 427 100% 69.7% 100% 73.9% 1.12 0.12 1.12 1.73
charter.com 580K 60.8 N/A 60.8 59.9 478 N/A 478 484 78.0% N/A 78.0% 89.0% 1.63 N/A 1.63 1.84
frontiernet.net 67K 36.5 6,247.6 36.5 16.7 785 6,101 785 689 3.6% 0.8% 3.6% 99.4% 0.05 0.00 0.05 1.44
nttpc.ne.jp 0.9K 9.5 9,259.9 16.2 9.1 2,081 9,161 4,976 3,694 12.0% 16.2% 16.2% 57.6% 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.16
optusnet.com.au 100K 704.4 16,134.6 704.4 12.7 1,175 16,374 1,175 583 100% 49.8% 100% 98.9% 0.85 0.03 0.85 1.70
qwest.net 408K 3,426.6 8,038.7 8,038.7 17.6 6,856 7,361 7,361 427 0.0% 4.1% 4.1% 94.0% 0.00 0.01 0.01 2.20
Overall 1.6M 163.9 13,974.2 177.9 17.5 924.0 12,640.4 1,497.5 677.8 48.3% 6.1% 49.7% 92.3% 0.52 0.00 0.33 1.36
Table 8: Examples of locations extracted incorrectly by the DRoP baseline
Hostname Location extracted incorrectly by DRoP Correct location DRoP Rule
malton2259w-lp140-03-50-100-186-228.dsl.bell.ca malton→Malton, North Yorkshire, England malton, .ca→Malton, Canada %<<pop>>([^L]+L+D*){3}.bell.ca
200-96-182-198.cbace700.dsl.brasiltelecom.net.br dsl→ Daru, Sierra Leone cbace, .br→ Cuiabá, Brazil %<<iata>>.brasiltelecom.net.br
70-100-143-28.dsl2-pixley.roch.ny.frontiernet.net pixley→ Pixley, California, USA roch, ny→ Rochester, New York, USA %<<pop>>([^L]+L+D*){2}.frontiernet.net
st0120.nas931.m-hiroshima.nttpc.ne.jp nas→ Nassau, Bahamas hiroshima, .jp→ Hiroshima, Japan %<<iata>>([^L]+L+D*){2}.nttpc.ne.jp
d49-194-53-51.meb1.vic.optusnet.com.au vic→ Vicenza, Italy meb, vic, .au→Melbourne, Victoria %<<iata>>.optusnet.com.au
71-209-14-48.bois.qwest.net bois→ ’s-Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands bois→ Boise, Idaho, USA %<<pop>>.qwest.net
6.3 Academic baselines
We next evaluate against three state-of-the-art academic baselines.
Like our approach, they receive a hostname as input and attempt
to extract its location. The undns baseline from University of Wash-
ington consists of manually generated rules that map hostname
patterns to locations [44]. The DRoP baseline from CAIDA at Uni-
versity of California-San Diego relies on automatically generated
rules derived from hostname patterns and validated by active mea-
surement data (traceroutes) [20]. Finally, the DDec baseline also
from CAIDA combines the results from undns and DRoP [11].
Since all three baselines are accessed from a public web end-
point [11], we had to restrict the number of requests we made to a
manageable size, out of politeness. For testing we initially selected
multiple service providers of different sizes, spanning various coun-
tries around the world. However, the baselines were missing any
rules for several of these providers, including airtelbroadband.in
from India, bigpond.net.au from Australia, and megared.net.mx in
Mexico. Although the baselines have good rule coverage in North
America, they are at least partially lacking in international coverage.
In the interest of fairness, we selected a list of eight providers, each
of which are covered by at least two of the baselines.
To train the classifier, our sampling strategy only considered
approximately 60,000 data points out of the 40 million hostnames
in our training set. From our test set of 27 million IP addresses, we
selected all of the ground truth data points which intersected the
eight target providers, which yielded a testing subset of 1.6 million
hostnames. We issued these requests to the CAIDA web endpoint
and parsed the responses from each of the baselines.
Table 7 lists the results for each of the eight domains, as well as
the overall results across the entire testing subset. Our approach is
labeled RDNS in the table. We define the error distance in kilometers
to be the distance between where a model places the location of a
hostname, and the actual location of the IP address behind that host-
name. The first block of results shows median error distance in kilo-
meters. We observe that our model significantly outperforms
the baselines and its results are generally more stable across all
domains. We also observe that the median error distance for several
domains is abnormally high for the DRoP baseline, and sometimes
for the other baselines as well. To further investigate this surpris-
ing finding we manually verified a small sample of results. Table 8
lists examples of locations extracted incorrectly by the DRoP base-
line. In the last column of the table we list the rule that caused
the incorrect extraction. For example, DRoP incorrectly determines
that the hostname d49-194-53-51.meb1.vic.optusnet.com.au
is in Vicenza, Italy, using the rule %<<iata>>.optusnet.com.au.
Although the IATA airport code vic is indeed located in Vicenza,
the correct location is Melbourne, Victoria. We could not find any
optusnet.com.au hostname where the rule was correct. In conclu-
sion, the DRoP baseline contains incorrect rules for some domains.
The results for the undns baseline also indicate high error distance
for multiple test domains. After investigating the results, we found
that undns sometimes maps entire TLDs to a single city. For exam-
ple, the locations for all 163.data.com.cn hostnames are extracted
as Beijing, China. Lastly, since DDec is a combination of undns and
DRoP, it is also affected by incorrect rules.
The advantage of using median as a metric is that it is impervious
to outliers, which can favor our model that can place false positives
far from the actual location, generating larger outliers. To fairly
characterize the results, we also computed RMSE, a metric at the
other extreme of the spectrum. RMSE, which stands for root mean
squared error, easily gets swayed by large outliers. This poses a
disadvantage for our model. We compute it using the error distance
in kilometers for each hostname. The RMSE results in Table 7 show
that generally our approach still outperforms the baselines in 6 out
of 8 domains. In the two cases where our model has higher RMSE
than the models, the coverage of our model is higher.
In 3 out of 8 cases the undns baseline has 100% coverage. We
define coverage as the total number of hostnames where a model
made a decision, over the total number of hostnames in the test
set. undns having high coverage is a side effect of it using catch-all
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Figure 6: Academic Evaluation Error Distance
rules that map entire TLDs to a single city. In all three cases this
leads to poor results for both median error and RMSE.
We define the combined score as the inverse of RMSE multiplied
by coverage. As error distance improves (gets smaller), the com-
bined score increases, and vice versa. Similarly, higher coverage
also improves the combined score, and vice versa. Our approach
significantly outperforms all academic baselines when con-
sidering the combination of error distance and coverage.
Finally, Figure 6 displays the cumulative error distance in kilome-
ters. The X axis represents the maximum distance between the real
location and the predicted location. The Y axis shows how many
hostnames and their IP addresses fall within the error distance. For
instance, the <20 km column shows that our method, labeled RDNS,
places approximately 54% of hostnames in the ground truth set
within 20 kilometers of their actual location. Our method outper-
forms the baselines by a large margin. The DRoP baseline yields the
worst results, significantly underperforming the other methods.
6.4 Commercial baselines
In this work we focus on improving reverse DNS geolocation, which
is only one source of geolocation information. Table 2 reveals that
about a third of IP addresses have reverse DNS hostnames. A further
subset of these hostnames contain location hints. While this can re-
sult in hundreds of millions of hostnames with location information,
this is insufficient to completely cover the IPv4 space.
Commercial geolocation databases combine and conflate multi-
ple geolocation data sources. Information from reverse DNS host-
names is required but not sufficient to compile a full geolocation
database. Our approach, which can output multiple potentially
valid location candidates for a given hostname, lends itself to being
combined with other data source to form a more complete database.
Although reverse DNS geolocation on its own cannot match com-
mercial databases, we evaluate our approach to show that our ap-
proach can complement and potentially improve existing databases.
We trained our classifier as described in Section 6.3. We then ob-
tained two state of the art commercial IP geolocation databases. We
tested our approach against the two commercial database providers
A and B using our entire test dataset of 27 million hostnames. The
first four graphs in Figure 7 show that on certain domains our ap-
proach outperforms, and thus can be used to improve, commercial
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databases. However, as expected, the fifth graph shows that over-
all the commercial databases still outperform our method. Results
show that median error is 43.7, 16.7, 11.1 kilometers, and RMSE is
4649, 545.3, 545.9 for RDNS, Provider A, and Provider B, respectively.
7 PRIVACY
Online privacy is becoming increasingly important. For example,
Pew research has found in 2016 that while many Americans are will-
ing to share personal information in exchange for accessing online
services, they are o ten cautious about disclosing their information
and frequently unhappy about what happens to that information
once companies have collected it [38]. We have designed both our
approach and our evaluation with this sensitive subject in mind.
Our proposed geolocation method relies on reverse DNS host-
names shared publicly by Internet Service Providers. These host-
names provide only coarse city-level or region level location infor-
mation. Therefore our approach may be more privacy conscious
than the widespread industry practice of requesting exact GPS
coordinates through mobile apps or the HTML5 Geolocation API.
Furthermore, the ground truth set was anonymized before we
had access to it by modifying raw locations in a random direction
by 200 meters, aggregating all locations reported for an IP address,
and reducing location accuracy to city-level.
8 REPRODUCING RESULTS
To aid in reproducing and extending our results, we are open sourc-
ing all the major components of our approach, including the host-
name splitter and the terms blacklist, our sampling strategy, the
primary and secondary feature generators, as well as the classifier
itself. For feature generation we have purposely used mainly freely
available datasets as described in Section 3. While we cannot in-
clude our ground truth set because it is proprietary, we will make
available a binary version of our model. We will also publish in-
structions on creating a ground truth set using public datasets by
using our sampling strategy to minimize any manual labeling.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We presented a machine learning approach to geolocating reverse
DNS hostnames. Our method significantly outperforms several
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state of the art academic baselines and it is competitive and comple-
mentary with commercial baselines. Our method outputs multiple
plausible locations in case of ambiguity. It thus lends itself to being
combined with other data sources to form a more complete geolo-
cation database. Our future work will focus on combining reverse
DNS hostname information with WHOIS databases and network
delay to form a geolocation database across the entire IP space.
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